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We examine how different investment horizons, and consequently the num-
ber of hands through which a security passes during its life, affect prices in a 
laboratory market populated by overlapping generations of investors. We 
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horizon investors compared to markets with long-horizon investors; (ii) for 
a given maturity of security, price deviations increase as investment hori-
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1. Introduction 
According to standard finance theory, prices of securities are close to, or tend towards, 
their fundamental value – the sum of discounted present values of expected future cash flows.  
Variations in investment horizons of investors do not enter the theory. Even if a market is 
dominated by short-horizon investors, they are assumed to form rational and common 
knowledge expectations about the behavior of subsequent generations of investors all the way 
from near to distant future, and the resulting rational expectation equilibrium (REE) assures 
prices near the fundamental values at any time. 
The feasibility of markets attaining the rational expectation equilibrium (REE) de-
pends critically on whether two assumptions hold: (1) all generations of investors form ra-
tional expectations, and (2) this expectation formation is common knowledge among all gen-
erations of investors. We argue that these assumptions are too strong to be expected to hold in 
practice where heterogeneity of expectation formation across individuals and the lack of 
common knowledge thereof are more of a norm than an exception. Some investors, or entire 
generations of them, may not form rational expectations, and even if all generations of inves-
tors do so, the challenge of such expectations to be common knowledge across or even within 
the generations is unlikely to be met.  
When these two conditions are not met, there is little reason for short-horizon inves-
tors to rationally expect future prices and therefore current market prices to equal the funda-
mental values of the securities traded. Market prices may be dominated by other factors and 
become indeterminate. For a security with a given maturity, as the investment horizon of in-
vestors gets shorter, the number of times the security will change hands (i.e., the number of 
generations that hold the security) between present and the maturity increases. With this in-
crease, the chances of all these generations of investors forming rational expectations and 
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such expectations being common knowledge also declines, and the likelihood and magnitude 
of price indeterminacy should be expected to get amplified. 
Several theoretical contributions suggest that investors’ short-trading horizons may 
cause security prices to deviate from their fundamental values. The rational bubble literature 
shows the possibility that price bubbles emerge as the rational expectation equilibrium (REE) 
for securities with infinite maturity (e.g. Blanchard and Watson 1982, Tirole 1985). In a sec-
ond class of models deviation from fundamentals is rooted in short-horizon investors’ hetero-
geneous beliefs about future dividends and prices; they form their expectations of future pric-
es based on future investors’ beliefs or noisy public information, and generate current prices 
that depart from fundamentals (Allen, et al. 2006, Delong, et al. 1990a, 1990b, Dow and Gor-
ton 1994, Froot, et al. 1992). All these models assume that at least the current short-horizon 
investors form rational expectations of future prices considering how they are determined by 
future investors’ behavior or beliefs (whether rational or not). 
In contrast to the prior research, we explore the feasibility of investors forming ration-
al expectation by dropping the infinite maturity and heterogeneity of dividend expectations. 
We design and conduct experimental markets in which a security has common knowledge 
finite maturity and common knowledge certain dividends. By excluding the factors that are 
supposed to cause the prices to deviate from the fundamentals in the above mentioned classes 
of models, we examine if the deviation between prices and fundamentals may be rooted in 
more basic difficulty of forming rational expectations and arriving at REE. 
In our laboratory security markets, we vary the length of trading horizon of investors, 
and consequently the number of times the security changes hands during the 16 trading peri-
ods until maturity. A single kind of simple securities (each paying a single, certain, common 
knowledge terminal dividend of 50 at the end of Period 16) is traded in these markets. This 
simplest of designs leaves little room for doubt in the mind of any subject that the fundamen-
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tal value of the security is 50. The security market has an overlapping generations structure 
(Tirole, 1985). In any given period, two generations of investors are in the market. Members 
of entering, “younger” generations are endowed with cash, so they can buy securities from the 
overlapping “older” generation which will leave the market. Investors can sell their securities 
to members of the following overlapping generation before exiting the market. Since only the 
members of the very last generation collect the dividends, all others are short-horizon inves-
tors trading in the hope of capital gains (see Figure 1). 
Standard pricing models suggest that the market price of this security should be close 
to the fundamental value of 50 throughout. Indeed, the simple calculation of rational expecta-
tion equilibrium (REE) tells us that the price is equal to 50. Even though short-horizon inves-
tors exit the market and do not receive terminal dividends, they could rationally predict the 
future sales price being equal to 50, because they would consider that all subsequent genera-
tions of investors form the same rational expectations.  
This REE outcome, however, was not supported in our laboratory. The experimental 
results show that with short-horizon investors in the market, transaction prices deviate sub-
stantially from the fundamental value of 50. Specifically, we find that (i) in periods with only 
short-horizon investors present prices are more likely to depart from fundamentals, compared 
to prices in periods with long-horizon investors present, (ii) prices are more likely to depart 
from fundamentals as investment horizons shrink (i.e., the securities changes hands more of-
ten over their 16 periods of life), and (iii) concerning liquidity we find that total amount of 
cash supplied in the market affects the direction of price deviation in a market with short-
horizon investors. While prices tend to exceed the fundamental value in high-liquidity ses-
sions, they fall short of the fundamental value in low-liquidity sessions. (iv) By examining 
price expectation data submitted by predictors (non-trading subjects) during the experiment 
we conclude that in the presence of short-horizon investors, price expectations are formed 
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based not on backward induction from the fundamentals, but forward induction from recent 
price changes. The data point to the possibility that short trading horizons amplify mispricing 
of securities in financial markets outside the laboratory, causing positive and negative price 
bubbles depending on the availability of liquidity. The model, experimental design, hypothe-
ses, results and concluding remarks are given in the following sections.  
 
2. Investment Horizons and Security Prices 
Let us consider a security that matures at time t+m. For simplicity, the security pays 
only a terminal dividend D at time t+m. D is non-stochastic and common knowledge among 
the investors. Without loss of generality, assuming a zero discount rate, the fundamental value 
of the security at time t is: 
Ft = D  (1) 
 
2.1. Pricing in a market with long-horizon investors 
We define long-horizon investors as those whose investment horizons are longer than 
or equal to m. They hold the security to its maturity to collect its cash dividends D. The value 
of the security to such an investor at time t, Vt (and its price Pt in a market populated by such 
homogenous investors) is equal to the fundamental value of the security D (without loss of 
generality, setting discount rate to zero):  
Pt = Vt = D   (2) 
 
2.2. Pricing in a market with short-horizon investors 
Next consider short-horizon investors with investment horizon k < m, who buy the se-
curity at time t, hold it for k periods, and sell it at t+k to exit the market before the security 
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matures. The value of the security to these investors Vt and its price Pt in a market populated 
by such homogenous investors is:  
Pt = Vt = Et (Pt+k)  (3) 
where Pt+k is the security price at t + k and Et (.) is the investors’ homogeneous expectation at 
time t. Price Pt depends on the investor’s expectation of the future sales price, Et (Pt+k). In this 
market, it seems that the price can take any value depending on investors’ expectations, i.e., 
prices are not necessarily anchored to the fundamental value.  
The standard security pricing models, however, assume that short-horizon investors 
form rational expectations of future prices through a recursive process from near to distant 
future, resulting in a rational expectation equilibrium (REE) in which the current price of the 
security is equal to its fundamental value. The argument is as follows. Investors at t rationally 
expect that equation (3) holds for the subsequent generation of investors at t+k.  
 Pt+k = Vt+k = Et+k (Pt+2k) (4) 
Investor at t use equation (4) to form their expectations of Pt+k:  
Et (Pt+k) = Et (Et+k (Pt+2k))  (5) 
where Et (Et+k (.)) is the expectation of investor at time t of expectation of an investor at time 
t+k about (.). Pt is obtained by substituting (5) into (3). 
Pt = Et (Et+k (Pt+2k))  (6) 
The price of the security at time t depends on the investor’s expectations at time t of the sub-
sequent generation’s expectations at time t+k of price at t+2k (second-order expectations).   
To form the second-order expectations (Et (Et+k (Pt+2k))), update (3) by 2k time peri-
ods,  
Pt+2k = Et+2k (Pt+3k). (7) 
The rational expectation of investors at time t+k is  
Et+k (Pt+2k) = Et+k (Et+2k (Pt+3k)). (8) 
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Then, the second-order expectations of investors at time t are described as  
Et (Et+k (Pt+2k)) =  Et (Et+k (Et+2k (Pt+3k))) (9) 
Substituting (9) into (6), we get 
Pt = Et (Et+k (Et+2k (Pt+3k))). (10) 
Equation (10) indicates that Pt depends on the investors’ third-order expectations of Pt+3k. 
To form the third-order expectations, update (3) by 3k time periods and obtain the ra-
tional expectation of investors at time t+2k of Pt+3k, and so on. Repeating this substitution 
process, we obtain the price equation including higher order expectations of subsequent pric-
es. 
Pt = Et (Et+k (Et+2k (...Et+m-2k(Pt+m-k)))...). (11) 
Finally, at time t+m-k, the price should be equal to the terminal dividend D that the 
last (m/k th) generation of investors receives from the security: 
Pt+m-k = D. (12) 
Then investors at time t+m-2k should form their rational expectations of Pt+m-k using equation 
(12): 
Et+m-2k (Pt+m-k) = D. (13) 
Substituting (13) into (11),   
Pt = Et (Et+k (Et+2k (...Et+m-3k(D)))...).  (14) 
By assumption, since D is common knowledge, 
Pt  = D = Ft.  (15) 
This completes the derivation of the rational expectations equilibrium (REE) that Pt = Ft. Un-
der the standard security pricing model, even when investors have short trading horizons, the 
price of the security with fixed maturity is determined through the investors recursively form-
ing a series of rational expectations and is equal to the fundamental value of the security at 
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any time. It suggests that the formation of the security price does not depend on the length of 
investment horizons. 
 
2.3. Short investment horizon and feasibility of rational expectations 
The standard security pricing model outlined above critically depends on two assump-
tions:  
Assumption 1: Investors form rational expectations of future prices, knowing that fu-
ture generation of investors exhaust arbitrage opportunities.  
Assumption 1 means that investors at time t rationally expect Pt+k knowing that equation (4) 
holds at time t+k, and that investor at time t+m-2k rationally expect Pt+m-k knowing that equa-
tion (12) holds.  
Assumption 2: Investors’ rational expectation formation is common knowledge among 
all generations of investors.  
Assumption 2 implies that investors at time t form second-order expectations of Pt+2k (equa-
tion (9)) knowing that investors at time t+k form rational expectations of Pt+2k (equation (8)); 
investors at time t form third-order expectations of Pt+3k knowing that investors at time t+k 
know that investors at time t+2k form rational expectations, and so on. 
 Assumption 1 requires investors not only to have cognitive ability to surmise the mar-
ket where they will sell the security, but also to believe that subsequent generations of inves-
tors are rational and that they make trades in a frictionless market. However, as recent theo-
retical models assume (Abreu and Brunnermeier 2003, Delong, et al. 1990a, 1990b), inves-
tors may not believe other investors’ rationality. Further, market frictions such as borrowing 
and short-sales constraints may prevent perfect arbitrage (as models such as Allen, et al. 1993 
and Scheinkman and Xiong 2003 assume).  
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 Assumption 2 places even higher demands on human cognition. Investors must not 
only form rational expectations themselves, but also believe that the subsequent generations 
of investors also do so. Further, they should believe that the future generations of investors 
also believe that their successors also form rational expectations. Generally, expectation for-
mation is private, and investors can hardly know how investors of subsequent generations 
form their expectations.   
Therefore, assumptions 1 and 2 are strong and cannot be expected to hold in practice. 
Some generations of investors may not form rational expectations, due to their limited cogni-
tive ability, or because they do not believe the subsequent generation of investors’ rationality. 
Or even if they form rational expectations, rational expectations may not be common 
knowledge across generations. Suppose that one generation (ith generation) of investors do 
not form rational expectations, or even if they do, they do not believe that the subsequent 
generation of investors form rational expectations. Then the repeated substitution process to 
obtain equation (11) stops at t+(i-1)k or t+ik and consequently the price is not linked to the 
terminal dividend D. In this case, in a market populated by short-horizon investors, prices are 
no longer anchored to the fundamental values. The above argument opens the possibility that 
the formation of the security price depends on investors’ trading horizons. We explore this 
possibility by conducting laboratory experiment described in the next section. 
 
3. Design of the experiment 
Overlapping generations structure.  
We implement security market experiments with an overlapping-generations structure 
as depicted in Figure 1. Each market session consists of 16 periods of 120 seconds each.6 The 
6 We chose 16 periods to (i) have the lowest number divisible by 2, 4, 8, and 16; (ii) ensure that each generation 
is in the market for at least two periods (one to buy, one to sell securities); and (iii) to complete each session in 
approximately 90 minutes. 
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security traded has a maturity of 16 periods and pays a single, common knowledge terminal 
dividend, D = 50, at the end of Period 16 to its holders from the last generation. 
Figure 1 about here 
At the beginning of Period 1, the initial generation of traders (G0) is endowed with 
units of the security and no cash. There are also ‘entering generations’ (G1, up to G8) in a 
market. ‘Entering generation’ means that the cohort of traders enters the market with cash but 
no securities. They can buy securities from the ‘older’ generation, and then usually sell those 
securities to the next ‘younger’ generation, and exit the market when another generation en-
ters (or the session ends). There are two overlapping generations of five traders each in the 
market at any time (for a total of ten active traders). 
Only the very last generations of traders collect the dividend (D = 50), which is paid 
for each unit of the security at the end of Period 16. They are considered long-horizon inves-
tors as described in Section 2.1, who hold the security until maturity to collect the dividend. 
In our model and experiment, we define “long-horizon” to include the date maturity; it does 
not depend on the absolute number of periods for which the generation is present in the mar-
ket. No other generation of traders collects any dividend. Any securities these traders hold at 
the time of their exit are worthless. They are the short-horizon investors as described in Sec-
tion 2.2, and trade for capital gains.  
In Treatment T1, long-horizon investors (G1) are present in all 16 periods of the mar-
ket session. In T2, T4, and T8 some periods have only short-horizon investors active in the 
market (Periods 1-8 in T2, Periods 1-12 in T4, and Periods 1-14 in T8) and in other periods 
long-horizon investors (the last generation) are present in the market (Periods 9-16 in T2, 
Periods 13-16 in T4 and Periods 15-16 in T8). Within each treatment the market structure 
(number of traders, number of securities and cash endowment of an entering generation) re-
mains unchanged over the 16 periods. 
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Treatments.  
The experiment has a 4x2 design in which the first treatment (number of entering 
generations) takes four different values and the second treatment (liquidity) takes two values 
(see Table 1). Varying the number of entering generations (1, 2, 4, and 8) induces investment 
horizons of 16, 8, 4, and 2 periods for initial generation, respectively, and changes the in-
vestment horizons for entering generations. The liquidity treatment varies the initial cash-to-
security ratio (C/A = amount of cash available to trade securities in the economy/the total 
fundamental value of all securities) for H (= 10) and L (= 2). Treatments are denoted as Txy 
with x [1,2,4, or 8] indicating the number of entering generation changes and y [H or L] indi-
cating high and low-liquidity treatments.  
Table 1 about here 
 
Security and cash endowments.  
Only the initial generation of traders (G0) is endowed with units of the security. All 
other generations of traders (G1-G8) are initially endowed with cash only. The cash endow-
ment of an entering generation is ten (or two) times the amount needed to buy all securities at 
its terminal dividend value in H (L) treatments. The amount of cash going out of the market 
with the exiting subjects will, of course, vary with each generation change and will be equal 
to the cash endowments of the entering subjects only by chance. To equalize the per period 
trading ‘workload’ across treatments, security and cash endowments are varied so as to keep 
the expected number of transactions for the entire 16-period session fixed at 160, independent 
of the number of generations (see Table 2 for details). Furthermore, to ensure that the total 
number of securities in the experimental market stays constant throughout the session, any 
securities in the hands of exiting traders are distributed at zero cost to randomly chosen 
members of the entering generation. This arrangement ensures that no buyer is forced to buy 
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a security at a price unacceptable to him/her, and the sellers have an incentive to sell their 
securities before exiting the market.7  
Table 2 about here 
 
Participation and subject circulation. 
To keep the total number of subjects within reasonable limits we recruit 18 subjects 
for each session.8 In every period, two generations (ten subjects in total) are active traders, 
while the other eight (five in T1) subjects are “predictors” who are rewarded on the basis of 
how accurately they predict the average trading price at the beginning of each period. Traders 
can buy and sell securities freely as long as neither their cash nor the security holdings be-
come negative. When a generation exits the market, five subjects are randomly chosen from 
the pool of eight predictors to form the newly entering generation for the next period, and the 
exiting generation joins the pool of predictors. Subjects stay in this pool for two or more pe-
riods. This rotating mechanism allows each generation of traders to gain experience and un-
derstanding of the environment without significantly interfering with the purpose of the ex-
periment (see Lim et al., 1994 and Marimon and Sunder, 1993). Since the subjects cannot 
know whether and when they will reenter the market, it is virtually impossible for their antic-
ipations about any future reentry into the market to influence their current behavior. 
 
Trading mechanism. 
The trading mechanism used is a continuous double auction with open order book 
with the opportunity to cancel a bid or ask before it is accepted, single-unit trades, and short-
7One may argue that the pressure on the exiting generation to sell its securities at the risk of forfeiture may cre-
ate a downward pressure on market prices. As shown in the results section, the prices in the low-liquidity treat-
ments tend to be below the fundamental value, but not in the high-liquidity treatments. Therefore, the time pres-
sure is not a consistent explanation of the observed data. 
8 In treatment T1 we invite only 15 subjects instead of 18 since no rotation is needed. Ten subjects trade through 
all 16 periods and the other five serve as ‘predictors’ (to be explained below). 
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ing constraint (no negative holdings of cash or securities allowed at any time). The single unit 
trades help homogenize the amount of trading “workload” per period across treatments. All 
cash and security balances are carried over to the following period until the trader exits. Each 
trading period lasts for 120 seconds with a digital wind-down clock on the trading screen. 




The final earnings of each member of the last generation of traders are calculated by 
[the number of securities in their hands at the end of Period 16]×[terminal dividend 50] + 
[cash holdings at the end of Period 16]. The final earnings of all other generations of traders 
are equal to [their cash holdings at time of exit]. Any unsold securities in the hands of these 
traders are forfeited, and randomly distributed in integer units among the members of the 
incoming generation at zero cost.9 The final earnings of traders are converted to euros at a 
pre-announced rate and paid out.10  
 
Prediction task.  
Of the 18 subjects (15 subjects in T1), eight (five in T1) act as observer/predictors in 
each period. At the beginning of each period, they are required to submit a prediction of the 
average transaction price of that period. Predictors’ earnings depend on the precision of their 
forecast. They earn 140 units of cash for a perfect forecast with one unit deduction for each 
9 During 48 sessions, a total of 970 securities were forfeited across 768 periods. This was mostly due to holders 
being unable to sell at a price acceptable to them. Forfeiture rates markedly increased with the number of gener-
ation changes and ranged from 1.1 percent of shares in T1H to 23 percent in T8L. 
10 The conversion is done at a predetermined rate announced at the outset. We use different rates for the first, 
transition, and last generations and the low/high-liquidity treatments to ensure identical average euro payouts. 
See Table 2 for details. 
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unit of error (subject to zero minimum).11 Calculations of period as well as cumulative earn-
ings are shown on the history screen at the end of each period (see Appendix A for details). 
 
Session termination.  
Subjects are informed through common knowledge instructions (with their under-
standing tested through a written questionnaire, see Appendix B for details) that the session 
ends with period 16, when each unit of the security pays a dividend D = 50 to its holders from 
the last entering generation. Earnings of each trader and predictor are calculated as described 
above, converted into euros, and paid to the subjects in private. 
 
Implementation. 
The experiment was conducted in the Innsbruck-EconLab using z-tree (Fischbacher, 
2007) in autumn 2013 with a total of 828 University of Innsbruck students (bachelor and 
master students from different fields). We ran 48 sessions in total (eight treatments of six 
sessions each). Most subjects had participated in other economics experiments earlier, but 
none participated in more than one session of the present study. Subjects were recruited using 
ORSEE by Greiner (2004). At the beginning of each session subjects had 15 minutes to read 
the instructions on their own and their questions were answered privately. This was done to 
eliminate any possible experimenter bias. Afterwards, the trading screen was explained in 
detail, followed by a questionnaire and two trial periods to allow subjects to become familiar 
with the environment, trader and prediction tasks, and mapping from experimental actions 
and events to their payoffs, and to test their comprehension. In both the trial periods, all sub-
11 The amount earned was later exchanged to Euros at a rate of 133:1. Hence, roughly one euro could be earned 
per prediction round.  
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jects played dual roles of trader and predictor. As an example, instructions for treatment T2L, 
along with screen shots, are provided in Appendix A. 
 
4. Hypotheses 
As discussed in Sections 2.1 and 2.2, in standard security pricing models investment 
horizons of traders do not enter the formation of security prices. In a market populated with 
long-horizon investors, arbitrage induces prices toward the fundamental values; even in a 
market populated with short-horizon investors, recursive formation of rational expectations of 
future prices and resulting rational expectation equilibrium (REE) keeps prices near the fun-
damental values. Following this argument, market prices in our experimental markets should 
be equal to the value of terminal dividend (50), irrespective of the market being populated 
with short or long-horizon investors.  
On the other hand, in laboratory experiment, we often observe that security prices de-
viate from the fundamental values. In most previous security market experiments, subjects 
stay in the market throughout the session and collect dividends from the securities they hold at 
the end; they correspond to the long-horizon investors (the last generation) in our model and 
experiment.12 Even in those experiments security prices are rarely exactly equal to the funda-
mental values (Plott and Sunder 1982); such deviations are often attributed to noise trading 
arising from subjects’ gradual and imperfect learning, confusion and irrationality. 13  We 
should not expect transaction price noise to be absent in our markets either. Since the magni-
tude and impact of the noise trading does not vary much across markets, we pose the follow-
ing null hypothesis from rational expectation equilibrium (REE) in standard security pricing 
models:  
12 See e.g. Smith et al. (1988) and the huge literature following it, reviewed in Palan (2013). 
13 This is true even when the security traded has a simple dividend structure (e.g. Smithet al. 2000, Lei, Noussair 
and Plott 2001, Kirchler et al. 2012). 
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Hypothesis I0: Deviations of prices from the fundamental value do not differ during periods 
when only short-horizon traders are present compared to periods when long-
horizon traders are present in the market.  
As shown in Figure 1, periods with only short-horizon traders (who do not collect terminal 
dividends) are periods 1-8 in T2, periods 1-12 in T4, and periods 1-14 in T8. Periods with 
both short and long-horizon traders are periods 1-16 (all periods) in T1, periods 9-16 in T2, 
periods 13-16 in T4, and periods 15-16 in T8. Hypothesis I0 states that the proximity of prices 
to fundamental value (terminal dividend 50) should be similar between the two sets of periods.  
In contrast, in Section 2.3, we considered the possibility that prices in a market with 
short-horizon investors may not achieve rational expectations equilibrium (REE) and unhinge 
from their fundamental values. Short-horizon investors may not recursively form rational ex-
pectations of future prices due to the difficulty in forming their own rational expectations 
and/or believing subsequent generations’ rational expectation formations. This possibility 
leads us to the following alternative hypothesis:  
Hypothesis IA: Deviations of prices from the fundamental value are larger during periods 
when only short-horizon traders are present compared to periods when long-
horizon traders are present in the market.  
We shall compare the magnitude of price deviations between two sets of periods, and examine 
if the experimental data reject the null hypothesis of no difference in favor of the alternative.  
Next, we will examine whether, for a security of a given maturity, the length of inves-
tors’ trading horizons influences pricing. In the four treatments (T1, T2, T4, and T8) of our 
experiment the security always has the same time to maturity (16 periods) and pays the same 
terminal dividend (50), but the investment horizons/number of periods in the market of the 
generation are different.  
16 
In T1, both G0 and G1 stay in the market for 16 periods (the average investment hori-
zon of traders is 16 periods). In T2, G0 stay for eight periods, G1 stay for 16 periods, and G2 
stay for eight periods (the average investment horizon is 10.7 periods). In T4, G0 stay for four 
periods, G1-G3 stay for eight periods, and G4 stay for four periods (the average investment 
horizon is 6.4 periods). In T8, G0 stay for two periods, G1-G7 stay for four periods, and G8 
stay for two periods (the average investment horizon is 3.6 periods). According to standard 
security pricing models, price paths should not differ across these four treatments; investors of 
each generation should recursively form rational expectations and prices at all times should 
equal the fundamental value (50). However, as discussed in Section 2.3, it may be difficult for 
investors of all generations to form common knowledge rational expectations. This gives rise 
to the alternative hypothesis that, as the average length of investment horizons becomes short-
er (and the number of remaining transfers of the security across generations until it matures 
increases), failure to form common knowledge rational expectations and departure of prices 
from the fundamentals become more likely. We set up the following null and alternative hy-
potheses: 
Hypothesis II0: For a security of a given maturity, the deviation of prices from the fundamen-
tal value is not affected by the length of investors’ trading horizons.  
Hypothesis IIA: For a security of a given maturity, the deviation of prices from the fundamen-
tal value increases as the length of investors’ trading horizons becomes 
shorter. 
While Hypothesis II0 predicts that Treatments T1, T2, T4, and T8 do not affect the price de-
viations from the fundamentals, Hypothesis IIA predicts that the price deviation is the largest 
in T8 and the second largest in T4, third in T2, and the smallest in T1. 
In many models, one of the key assumptions is frictionless markets. One of the most 
relevant frictions in markets is a liquidity constraint. To examine whether this factor plays a 
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role for pricing in our markets we vary the total amount of cash in a market by a factor of five. 
In treatments H (T1H, T2H, T4H, T8H) the total amount of cash in the market is 10 times the 
total value of all securities (the cash-to-security-value ratio, C/A-ratio is 10), while in treat-
ments L the C/A-ratio is 2. In standard finance theory, the amount of liquidity should not af-
fect prices, as it does not change the security’s fundamentals. However, ample experimental 
evidence suggests that liquidity significantly affects security prices: prices can be higher 
when liquidity is higher either through initial cash endowments or conditions which influence 
the C/A-ratio (Ackert et al. 2006, Breaban and Noussair 2014, Caginalp et al. 1998, Caginalp 
et al. 2001, Caginalp and Ilieva 2008, Deck et al. 2012, Haruvy and Noussair 2006, King et al. 
1993, Kirchler et al. 2012, Noussair et al. 2012, Porter and Smith 1995). We explore whether 
the amount of liquidity, measured by the C/A ratio, influences the price levels and price devi-
ations from fundamentals in our markets. We set up the following null and alternative hy-
potheses: 
Hypothesis III0: Prices will be the same irrespective of the total amount of cash in the market. 




Figures 2 and 3 show the evolution of transaction prices for each of the six independ-
ent sessions (volume-weighted mean transaction prices by period in thin grey lines) and the 
fundamental value (red bold line) for high-liquidity treatments (T1H, T2H, T4H, and T8H) 
and low-liquidity treatments (T1L, T2L, T4L, and T8L), respectively.14  Note that the funda-
14 We dropped two transactions that occurred above 800 from the analyses; the first transaction was at 999 in 
period 9 of a T2H market and it was one of 64 transactions in that period; it was probably a keyboard error made 
under heavy/fast trading. Second observation was at 900 in period 16 of a T2H market, and it was the only 
transaction in that period; it was probably caused by boredom because there had been no transactions in period 
15. We repeated the analyses without dropping two outliers and confirmed that the results were qualitatively 
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mental value – the terminal dividend of 50 – is constant across all periods throughout our 
experiment. Broken vertical lines mark the entry/exit points of overlapping generations of 
investors (compare Figure 1).  
Figures 2 and 3 about here 
Figure 2 for high-liquidity sessions shows that in T1H markets (the upper left panel) 
when the dividend collecting entering generation (G1) is always present, prices are generally 
close to fundamentals (50) throughout the session. While prices are relatively high in Period 
1, they tend towards the fundamentals with time (except in one session), and they converge to 
the fundamental value in the last period (Period 16) in four of the six markets. Noise in prices, 
especially transactions near 100 in one market in Period 16, suggests that arbitrage is far from 
perfect even in the last period. In contrast, in the other treatments (T2H, T4H, T8H), where 
only the last entering generations stay in the market long enough to collect dividends, devia-
tion of prices from fundamentals is greater and more persistent. Usually prices only converge 
towards fundamentals once the last generation enters. The visual inspection suggests that (i) 
the price formation is different between periods in which long-horizon investors (who collect 
the cash dividend) are present  and periods in which only short-horizon investors present, and 
(ii) the same securities (with the same dividend and the same maturity) have different price 
paths among the four treatments (T1H, T2H, T4H and T8H). These results are inconsistent 
with the prediction of REE and appear to reject Hypotheses I0 and II0 in favor of IA and IIA 
for the high-liquidity treatments. 
The low-liquidity sessions depicted in Figure 3 exhibit a similar tendency. While 
prices are close to fundamentals in periods with long-horizon investors (with the last genera-
tion) present, they deviate from fundamentals in periods with only short-horizon investors. In 
all periods in T1L, Periods 9-16 in T2L, Periods 13-16 in T4L, and Periods 15-16 in T8L 
unchanged. 
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where the respective (dividend collecting) last generation is present, prices are close to or 
converge near the fundamental value. They significantly deviate from the fundamentals in 
other periods. In addition, while price deviations from the fundamental value tend to be posi-
tive in high-liquidity treatment Figure 2, they tend to be negative for the low-liquidity ses-
sions in Figure 3. This observation favors rejecting the null hypothesis III0 for alternative IIIA. 
 
5.2 Analyses of price deviations from the fundamental value 
To examine hypotheses I and II we need to calculate deviations of prices from the 
fundamental value with a measure of mispricing per period. In the recent experimental securi-
ty market literature, the degree of mispricing is usually measured by Relative Absolute Devi-
ation (RAD) proposed by Stöckl et al. (2010). 
RAD = 1
𝑁𝑁
∑ |𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 − 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡|/|𝐹𝐹�|𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡=1  (16) 
where |𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 − 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡| is the deviations of (volume-weighted) mean price from the fundamental 
value in period t, |𝐹𝐹�| is the absolute average fundamental value in the session, t denotes peri-
od number, and N stands for the total number of periods. RAD measures the average level of 
mispricing across all periods throughout the session. 
As we wish to compare the degree of price deviations among periods even within a 
session (e.g., between the periods with long-horizon investors and those with only short-
horizon investors), we propose Period-RAD, a measure of mispricing per period.  
Period-RAD =  |𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 − 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡|/𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡  (17) 
In our experiment, as 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 (fundamental value in period t) is constant at a value of 50 through-
out the session, Period-RAD becomes 
Period-RAD =  |𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 − 50|/50.  (18) 
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We calculated Period-RAD for each of 16 periods in 24 high-liquidity sessions (six 
sessions×four treatments) and 24 low-liquidity sessions. 15 
Table 3 about here 
 The two panels of Table 3 show the six-session average of Period-RAD for each pe-
riod of the high and low-liquidity treatments. Periods with long-horizon investors (the last 
generation) present are shaded in grey and those with only short-horizon investors present are 
not shaded. Also, the periods in which the same two generations trade, are bordered in bold. 
In both Panels A (high-liquidity session) and B (low-liquidity session), we find that (for a 
given period sequence number) Period-RAD is almost always larger in markets with only 
short-horizon investors (white cells) than in periods with long-horizon investors (grey-shaded 
cells). Figure 4 show the average Period-RAD for each period sequence number, comparing 
the markets with long-horizon investors (e.g. Period 1 in T1) with those with only short-
horizon investors (e.g. Period 1 in T2, T4, and T8), in high (panel A) and low liquidity (panel 
B) sessions, respectively. We observe that for all period sequence numbers in high and low 
liquidity treatments (14 high and 14 low liquidity period sequence numbers), the average Pe-
riod-RAD across markets with only short-horizon investors is larger than the one across mar-
kets with long-horizon investors. These results show that for any given period sequence num-
ber, the price deviation from the fundamentals is larger in markets with only short-horizon 
investors compared to that in markets with long-horizon investors. On average, this price 
deviation exceeds by a factor of 2.45 (4.06) under high (low) liquidity.   
Figure 4 about here 
15 We excluded three periods from the sample of high-liquidity sessions: period 16 in Market 5 of T1H and peri-
od 15 in Market 5 of T2H had no transactions and period 16 in Market 5 of T2H had only the outlier transaction 
price of 900 (see, footnote 14). We also deleted three periods for the low-liquidity sample (periods 11 and 13 in 
Market 3 in T1L and period 14 in Market 3 of T8L had no transactions). These deletions reduced the sample size 
for each liquidity treatment to 381. The resulting average of Period-RAD is 0.735 across all high-liquidity ses-
sions and 0.333 for the low-liquidity sessions. 
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Table 4 confirms these observations. It compares the average Period-RADs across all 
periods with long-horizon investors (0.401 in H and 0.140 in L) with periods populated only 
by short-horizon investors (1.024 in H and 0.502 in L). The respective difference (0.623 in H 
and 0.362 in L) is large in absolute terms and statistically significant at the 1% level for each 
liquidity treatment (two-sided t-test). The Null hypothesis I0 (that the presence of short-
horizon investors makes no difference in price deviations) can be rejected in favor of the al-
ternative IA (that the presence of short-horizon traders increases mispricing). Apparently, 
short-horizon investors do not tend to value the securities by forming rational expectations of 
future prices. The REE hypothesis does not hold in our laboratory markets, although theoreti-
cally, the REE would seem to be an obvious outcome of this simple market environment. 
Table 4 about here 
In Section 2.3, we discussed that with fewer entering generations left, it should be rel-
atively easier for short-horizon investors to form rational expectations about the future prices, 
as compared to situations where many generations are yet to enter the market (because then 
they have to form higher-order expectations through a recursive process over more genera-
tions). To examine whether the number of security transfers across generations of investors 
that remain till maturity affects mispricing, we calculated averages of Period-RAD across 
periods with only short-horizon investors, conditional on the number of entering generations 
left until maturity. The number of entering generations left is one in Periods 1-8 in T2, Peri-
ods 9-12 in T4, and Periods 13-14 in T8. It is two in Periods 5-8 in T4 and Periods 11-12 in 
T8; and so on.  
Figure 5 about here 
The resulting average Period-RADs are given in Figure 5. The figure shows that the 
averages of Period-RAD are high even when the number of remaining security transfers 
across generations is one (0.677 in H and 0.546 in L liquidity sessions), and both are signifi-
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cantly different from 0.401 (in H) and 0.140 (in L) in the presence of long-horizon investors. 
This suggests that short-horizon investors have difficulty in forming rational expectations 
even if it involves only one future generation left. This difficulty may arise from investors’ 
limited cognitive ability in rationally expecting the next generation’s valuation, and/or from 
investors’ doubt about whether the future generations will exhaust all arbitrage opportunities; 
they may not believe in the next generation’s rationality and in the market’s perfection. As 
we mentioned in Section 2.3, standard security pricing models to derive REE assume not only 
that investors form rational expectations (Assumption 1) but also that such expectations are 
common knowledge (Assumption 2). Our experimental results cast doubt on the empirical 
validity of even Assumption 1. It does not seem to be easy for investors to rationally expect 
others’ valuation and/or future market conditions. The results support the idea of Adam and 
Marcet’s (2011) theoretical research suggesting that if investors are rational based on their 
subjective beliefs but they have only imperfect market knowledge (lack of knowledge regard-
ing others’ preferences and beliefs), the stock price ceases to be anchored in the fundamental 
value.  
In Table 5, we see that the length of investors’ trading horizons affects the deviation of 
the security price from the fundamentals. We calculated the average of Period-RAD for T1, 
T2, T4, and T8, respectively, and compared them across these four treatments. Average Peri-
od-RAD in the high-liquidity treatments is the smallest (0.421) in T1, 0.586 in T2, 0.739 in 
T4, and the largest (1.187) in T8 (see panel A in Table 5), which are generally statistically 
different from each other (see, panel B in Table 5, which provides the difference in Average 
Period-RAD across treatments). The pattern is similar in the low-liquidity treatments, though 
with generally lower numbers. We conclude that given the maturity of the security, the shorter 
the investment horizon, and the higher the number of remaining security transfers across gen-
erations of investors, the greater the deviation of prices from fundamentals. This result rejects 
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Hypothesis II0 in favor of alternative IIA.  
Table 5 about here 
One may argue that our experimental results are consistent with the theoretical predic-
tions of previous literature, showing that investors’ short trading horizons give rise to price 
bubbles (e.g., Allen, et al. 2006, Blanchard and Watson 1982, Delong, et al. 1990a, 1990b, 
Dow and Gorton 1994, Froot et al. 1992, Tirole 1985). We should note, however, that our 
findings on the price indeterminacy associated with short trading horizons are obtained even 
in markets where the security has finite maturity and the dividend value has no uncertainty 
and is common knowledge, which excludes important factors postulated to cause bubbles in 
the prior literature. In our markets, price deviations and volatility stem from the difficulties of 
investors to form rational expectations, whereas the above literature (explicitly or implicitly) 
assumes that investors can form rational expectations of future prices.  
 
5.3 Liquidity supply and mispricing 
Hypothesis III explores whether liquidity supply in the market affects overall mispric-
ing and the price level. Visual inspection of Figures 2 and 3 already gives a tentative answer, 
as prices tend to be above the fundamental value in the high-liquidity sessions, but below the 
fundamental value in the low-liquidity sessions.  
To assess the direction of price deviations from fundamentals, we replace the relative 
absolute deviation measure (Period-RAD) used in the preceding subsection by the relative 
deviation measure (Period-RD): 
Period-RD =  (𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 − 50)/50  (18) 
where 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 is the mean price of period t. Period-RD is an analog of RD (Relative Deviation), 
proposed by Stöckl et al. (2010) which measures the average level of raw (not absolute) price 
deviations across all periods throughout the session. The resulting average of Period-RD 
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across all markets with high-liquidity is positive (0.534),16 but negative (-0.222) across all 
low-liquidity sessions; the difference (0.756) is statistically significant at 1% level This result 
rejects hypothesis III0 in favor of alternative IIIA. This confirms the impression from Figures 
2 and 3, where prices are mostly above the fundamental value in high-liquidity sessions and 
below the fundamental value in low-liquidity sessions. 
Table 6 about here 
Note that this liquidity effect on prices is larger when there are only short-horizon in-
vestors in the market. Analyzing the data in more detail, Table 6 compares average Period-
RD in periods with long-horizon investors present to those with only short-horizon investors. 
In high-liquidity treatments (C/A ratio = 10), the average Period-RD across periods with 
long-horizon investors is 0.295 (significantly different from zero at 1% level), which indi-
cates that prices are on average 29.5% higher than the fundamentals. On the other hand, the 
average Period-RD across periods with only short-horizon investors is much higher (0.741) 
and the difference (0.446) is statistically significant at the 1% level. This suggests that with 
high-liquidity, short-horizon investors amplify the magnitude of overpricing in financial mar-
kets. Usually, in a market dominated by long-horizon investors, prices above the fundamen-
tals should be more or less driven towards fundamentals by the arbitrage transactions of long-
horizon investors. However, in a market dominated by short-horizon investors who care only 
about future sales prices, if investors have difficulties in forming rational expectations, they 
would not be likely to conduct arbitrage between high prices and fundamentals. Consequently, 
positive price deviations from fundamentals may persist over time.  
In the low-liquidity treatments (C/A-ratio = 2), the average of Period-RD when long-
horizon investors are present is -0.087, which is small and negative but significantly different 
16 This overpricing is consistent with the findings of the previous literature on security market experiments: in a 
market with investors who can receive dividends (corresponding to long-horizon investors in our experiment), a 
larger cash-to-security ratio is associated with greater positive mispricing (see, Palan’s (2013) survey article). 
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from zero at the 1% level. This indicates that the security prices under the fundamentals are 
not completely driven to fundamentals by the purchases of the long-horizon investors in our 
experiment. This imperfect arbitrage may be due to investors not having sufficient cash to 
buy securities under this level of liquidity.17 In the absence of long-horizon investors, the 
average Period-RD is -0.340, which is significantly lower than -0.087 at the 1% level. This 
result indicates that with comparative shortage of liquidity, investors’ short trading horizons 
magnify the undervaluation in financial markets. Figure 6 presents Period-RD classified by 
the number of generations left to enter the market. In the high-liquidity treatments (Panel A) 
Period-RDs generally increase with the number of generations left to enter the market, with 
all but one of the Period-RDs being significantly larger than in the periods when the divi-
dend-collecting last generation is present. In low-liquidity treatments (Panel B) five out of 
seven values of the Period-RDs are significantly smaller (more negative) than the Period-RD 
when the dividend-collecting last generation is present. 
Figure 6 about here 
We conjecture that large price declines in low-liquidity treatments could be caused by 
short-horizon investors’ fear of future market illiquidity.18 Suppose that short-horizon inves-
tors have difficulties in rationally expecting future sales prices and observe weak buy-order 
and low transaction prices in some period of our experiment. Then, they may sell the security 
now even at prices under 50, fearing that they may not be able to sell all their securities be-
fore their exit, or may be forced to dump them in fire sales. This behavior of short-horizon 
investors would tend to drive prices below fundamentals. This conjecture is supported by 
theoretical analyses of financial liquidity crises by Bernardo and Welch (2004) and Morris 
and Shin (2004). They point to short-horizon investors selling securities expecting future 
17 Note that a borrowing constraint is imposed in our experiment. 
18 In the high-liquidity treatments this is less likely as each individual trader has enough money to “buy the 
whole market”, i.e., buy all the assets in the market at their fundamental value. 
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market declines, and causing price drops. It is also consistent with an empirical study by Cel-
la et al. (2013) who find that during episodes of market turmoil, short-horizon investors sell 
more than long-horizon investors, and stocks held mostly by short-horizon investors experi-
ence larger price drops than stocks held mostly by long-horizon investors. In addition, Morris 
and Shin’s (2004) model predicts a V-shaped pattern in prices around the liquidity crisis: af-
ter the crisis, prices go back to fundamentals through the long-horizon investors’ arbitrage 
transactions. Cella et al. (2013) also report that stocks held mostly by short-horizon investors 
experience large price reversals after turmoil. These V-shaped price paths from theoretical 
and empirical studies are also observed in our low-liquidity sessions. As Figure 3 shows, in 
T2L, T4L, and T8L markets, prices tend to decline when there exist only short-horizon inves-
tors, but they generally recover and converge to fundamentals once long-horizon investors 
(the last generation) enter the market. 
 
5.4 Formation of Expectations 
If short-horizon investors have difficulties in forming rational expectations of future 
prices, how do they form their expectations? We use the data on expectations we gathered in 
our experiment to explore how the predictors form their expectations.19 
We postulate two models of the price expectation formation process; one is the fun-
damental model and the other is the trend model (Hirota and Sunder 2007). The fundamental 
model assumes that investors form expectations of future prices based on backward induction 
from the deviation of prices from the fundamental value of the security.  
 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+𝑘𝑘) = 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼(𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 − 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡)  (19) 
where α (>0) is the adjustment coefficient. With this model, investors expect future price 
appreciation (depreciation) if the fundamental value, Ft, is higher (lower) than the current 
19 We rely on predictors’ estimations in the analysis of expectation formation as these estimations do not bias the 
price formation process in the market. Since the market information sets of the traders and predictors are identi-
cal, there is no a priori reason to believe that the predictions of the two sets of subjects would be different. 
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price, Pt. In this model any α > 0 is consistent with the fundamental model, with α =1 corre-
sponding to perfect and instantaneous rational expectation formation supposed by the stand-
ard security pricing models 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+𝑘𝑘) = 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 for any k in any period t.  
On the other hand, the trend model assumes that investors form their expectations 
about the future price through forward induction based on recently observed price changes. 
𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+𝑘𝑘) = 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽(𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 − 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘)  (20) 
In this model, if , recent price increases (decreases) cause investors to expect further 
price increases (decreases) in the future; if , recent price increases (decreases) cause 
investors to expect future price decreases (increases). With this model, investors’ expectation 
of the future prices are based solely on recent price movements, irrespective of the fundamen-
tal value of the security. 
We can combine (19) and (20) into a general specification for the expectation for-
mation: 
𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+𝑘𝑘) = 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼(𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 − 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡) + 𝛽𝛽(𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 − 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘)  (21) 
This combined model allows for the possibility that investors use some combinations of 
backward induction from fundamentals and forward induction from recent prices.  
During the experiment, we collected data on expected mean transaction prices from 
the predictors at the beginning of each period. To use these data for estimation, we set k =1. 
Then, rearranging terms, (19), (20) and (21) become 
𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+1) − 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼(𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 − 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡)  (22) 
𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+1) − 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽(𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 − 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1)  (23) 
𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+1) − 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼(𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 − 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡) + 𝛽𝛽(𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 − 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1)  (24) 
where Ft = 50 (the terminal dividend) throughout all periods in all sessions in the experi-
ment.20 




                                                          
The cross-sectional average of the predictors’ price expectations (for the incoming pe-
riod) is used as 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+1), and the average price of the previous period and the average price 
of the period just ended and the one before that are used as 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 and 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1, respectively. We 
estimated equations (22), (23) and (24) using ordinary least squares regression with constant 
terms. We conducted the estimations on the periods with long-horizon investors as well as the 
periods with only short-horizon investors for each of high and low-liquidity treatments. Table 
7 shows the estimation results. 
Table 7 about here 
Overall, we find that the coefficient of (Ft – Pt) in the fundamental (FUND) model 
ranges from 0.070 to 0.401, which is significantly more than zero but less than one (at 1% 
level). This shows that the perfect rational expectation formation (𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+1) = 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡) is not sup-
ported not only in periods with only short-horizon investors but also in periods with long-
horizon investors.21  
Although the data rejected the rational expectation formation, it reveals that the fun-
damental value of the security plays a role of anchor to the expectation of future price in 
markets with long-horizon investors. If we first look at the results of high-liquidity sessions 
(upper half of Table 7), we find that in the presence of long-horizon investors, backward in-
duction from fundamental values fits the data better than the forward induction from recent 
prices. The coefficient of (Ft – Pt) is significantly positive (0.197) in the fundamental (FUND) 
model, but the coefficient of (Pt -Pt-1) is not significant in the trend (TREND) model. In the 
combined (COMBINED) model, only the fundamental factor (Ft – Pt) is statistically signifi-
cant. These results suggest that in the periods with long-horizon investors, the fundamental 
that about half of participants follow the linear autoregressive predictions with 2 lags (AR(2) prediction) which 
can be interpreted as a trend following strategy (trend extrapolators or contrarians). Using our notation, AR(2) 
prediction is expressed as Et (Pt+1) = γ + β1Pt +  β2Pt-1 and it becomes our trend model (equation (23)) when γ = 
0,  β1 +  β2 = 1, and β2 =  –β.  
21 This result is consistent with the empirical results shown by Greenwood and Shleifer (2014). They show that 
expectations of investors captured by the surveys are not at all the expectations obtained from rational expecta-
tion models. 
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value of the security not only determines the transaction prices but also affects the future 
price expectations. Arbitrage transactions of long-horizon investors enable market partici-
pants to expect that future prices will converge to the fundamentals. 
In contrast, the data from periods in which only short-horizon investors are present 
support the trend model better than the fundamental model. In these periods, the coefficient 
of (Ft – Pt) in the FUND model shrinks (to 0.109) to remain marginally significant. However, 
it becomes much smaller (0.078) and insignificant in the combined (COMBINED) model. On 
the contrary, the coefficient of (Pt -Pt-1) is -0.301 and -0.270 in the trend (TREND) model and 
the combined (COMBINED) model, respectively, and both are statistically significant at the 
1% level. These results suggest that in a market with only short-horizon investors, investors 
tend to form their expectations of future prices on the basis of recently observed prices 
through forward induction, and not on the basis of the fundamental value through backward 
induction. Also, the negative coefficient of (Pt -Pt-1) shows that market participants expect 
price reversals; a price rise of 1 from the previous period lowers the expectation of next peri-
od price by about 0.3. This observed reversal expectations are in a sharp contrast to the mo-
mentum (extrapolative) expectations of investors reported by previous studies in the field 
(Greenwood and Shleifer 2014, Vissing-Jorgensen 2003) and laboratory (Hirota and Sunder 
2007, Hommes, et al. 2005). 
We observe the same tendency in the results for low-liquidity sessions (lower half of 
Table 7). For the periods with long-horizon investors, the coefficient of (Ft – Pt) is signifi-
cantly positive in both the fundamental (FUND; 0.401) and the combined (COMBINED; 
0.419) models. For the periods with only short-horizon investors, the coefficient of (Pt -Pt-1) 
is significantly negative in both trend (TREND; -0.162) and combined (COMBINED; -0.180) 
models.22 These results confirm that the expectations about future prices are formed based on 
22 (Ft-Pt) is also significant in the fundamental and combined models, albeit with much smaller estimated coeffi-
cients (0.070 and 0.065) as compared to the periods with long-horizon investors (0.401 and 0.419). We can infer 
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the fundamentals in a market with long-horizon investors, and are based on recent price 
changes in a market with only short-horizon investors.   
 
6. Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
This paper proposes, and empirically tests in the laboratory, the idea that security pric-
es tend to deviate from fundamental values when markets are populated by traders who have 
short investment horizons (relative to maturity of the security). In such markets, investors’ 
expectations about the future cash flows beyond their own personal investment horizon are 
not relevant for valuation, because cash flows beyond the horizon are replaced in trading deci-
sions by expectations about future prices. Standard finance theory, however, claims that even 
in such markets prices tend toward the fundamental value constituting the rational expectation 
equilibrium (REE). We argued that this well-known proposition critically depends on implau-
sibly strong assumptions about the rational expectation formation of all generations of inves-
tors and their common knowledge. We conjectured that these assumptions cannot be met in 
practice and that prices may deviate from fundamentals and tend to become indeterminate in 
financial markets populated by short-horizon investors.  
We conducted security market experiments where all investors have identical common 
knowledge beliefs about the fundamental value of the security. Our laboratory results show 
that (i) deviations of prices from fundamental values increase significantly when only short-
horizon investors are present in the market. This result is consistent with our proposition that 
short-horizon investors fail to form rational expectations to bring prices into the proximity of 
fundamental values. (ii) We further found that the shorter the investment horizon (the larger 
the number of remaining security transfers across generations till maturity of the security), the 
larger the absolute mispricing in the market. (iii) We varied liquidity supply across our treat-
that the trend model is better supported over the fundamental model in periods with short-horizon investors for 
low as well as high-liquidity sessions. 
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ments and found that higher liquidity led to overpricing of the security, while low-liquidity on 
average led to underpricing of the security, and these over- and under-pricing are amplified by 
the presence of short-horizon investors. (iv) When short-horizon investors are present, price 
expectations are formed based not on backward induction from the fundamentals, but on for-
ward induction from recent price changes. 
These laboratory results do not support the REE prediction made by standard finance 
theory, which ignores the effect of the investment horizon on security prices. Given our re-
sults, it is reasonable to consider that frequently observed price indeterminacies and bubbles 
in markets outside the laboratory may arise from the presence of short-horizon investors (rela-
tive to the maturity of the security they are trading, e.g., gold, real estate, and corporate equi-
ty). The mechanism we test in the laboratory (in which short-trading horizons imply more 
transfers of the security between consecutive holders till its maturity) cause price bubbles; it is 
different from the ones suggested by extant theoretical literature – rational bubble models (e.g. 
Blanchard and Watson 1982, Tirole 1985) and heterogeneous belief models (e.g. Allen, et al. 
2006, Delong, et al. 1990a, 1990b, Dow and Gorton 1994, Froot, et al. 1992). We showed that 
even in a market with a very simple environment, it is a difficult task for short-horizon inves-
tors to form rational expectations of future prices. This  was further confirmed by the analyses 
of the price prediction data gathered in the laboratory. These findings doubt on the validity of 
investors’ ability to form rational expectation – a commonly applied assumption in finance 
literature. Since securities traded in real financial markets have far more complex features 
(uncertainty, information asymmetries, heterogeneous beliefs regarding future cash flows), we 
conjecture that investors face greater challenges in rational expectation formation. Building 
theories by relaxing the assumption underlying rational expectations seems to be one way to 
explain the price volatility and indeterminacy in financial markets (see, for example, Adam 
and Marcet 2011). 
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Several implications emerge from this study. First, greater inefficiency, pricing anoma-
lies, and the so-called “behavioral” phenomena which cause security prices to depart from 
fundamentals are more likely to be observed when markets are dominated by short-horizon 
investors. Second, the excess price volatility in real stock markets reported by previous empir-
ical studies (e.g. LeRoy and Porter 1981, Shiller 1981) may be caused by the existence of 
short-horizon investors. This raises the empirical question of whether stock price volatility is 
larger in periods and markets which are populated by a greater number of short-horizon inves-
tors. Third, we conjecture that securities with longer maturities are more prone to price inde-
terminacy. Given investors’ trading horizons, as the maturity becomes longer, the number of 
generations that hold the security between the present and the maturity date increases, and it 
becomes more difficult for investors to form rational expectations and prices tend to deviate 
more from fundamentals. Fourth, the securities with longer durations are more likely to devi-
ate from the fundamentals.23 As the duration of a security increases, investors receive a small-
er portion of its value from cash flow within their horizons and their valuation is determined 
more significantly by capital gains (future sales prices) for which they face a difficulty in 
forming expectation. This is consistent with historical observation that price bubbles often 
occur in securities with longer duration, such as high-growth and new technology stocks. Fifth, 
this duration argument points to a possibility that dividend policy matters in security valuation, 
which challenges Miller and Modigliani’s (1961) irrelevance proposition. As firms with larger 
payout ratios have shorter durations, we should expect that their stock prices are more stable 
and closer to the fundamentals than the prices of firms with smaller or zero payouts. Sixth, 
monetary policy and prudence policy would matter for the stabilization of security prices. Our 
laboratory data showed that excess or shortage of liquidity causes prices to deviate signifi-
cantly from fundamentals in markets with short-horizon investors. This implies that control-
23 Duration is the weighted average time of a security’s cash flows. 
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ling money stock and credit availability is important for stabilizing not only the real economy 
but also security prices when markets are dominated by short-horizon investors.  
A future experiment may explore how, and to what degree, the presence of long-
horizon traders alongside short-horizon traders may moderate the tendency of prices to devi-
ate from fundamental values. Similar to Hirota and Sunder (2007), we presented evidence that 
the future dividends tend to anchor prices to fundamentals in markets with long-horizon in-
vestors. In a future experiment we plan to extend the present results to markets with mixtures 




Abreu, D. and Brunnermeier, M. K. (2003) Bubbles and Crashes, Econometrica, 71, 173-204. 
Ackert, L. F., Charupat, N., Church, B. K., and Deaves, R. (2006) Margin, Short Sell, and 
Lotteries in Experimental Security Markets, Southern Economic Journal, 73, 419-436. 
Adam, K. and Marcet, A. (2011) Internal Rationality, Imperfect Market Knowledge and Secu-
rity Prices, Journal of Economic Theory, 146, 1244-1252. 
Allen, F., Morris, S., and Postlewaite, A. (1993) Finite Bubbles with Short Sale Constraints 
and Asymmetric Information, Journal of Economic Theory, 61, 206-229. 
Allen, F., Morris, S., and Shin, H. S. (2006) Beauty Contests and Iterated Expectations in 
Security Markets, The Review of Financial Studies, 19, 719-752. 
Bernardo, A. E. and Welch, I. (2004) Liquidity and Financial Market Runs, Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 119, 135-158. 
Blanchard, O. J. and Watson, M. W. (1982) Bubbles, Rational Expectations and Financial 
Markets. Crisis in the Economic and Financial Structure, Wachtel, H. M. (Ed.), Lex-
ington Books, 295-315. 
Breaban, A. and Noussair, C. N. (2014) Fundamental Value Trajectories and Trader Charac-
teristics in an Security Market Experiment, CentER Working paper No. 2014-010. 
Caginalp, G., Porter D. and Smith V. (1998) Initial Cash/Security Ratio and Security Prices: 
an Experimental Study, PNAS USA, 95, 756–761. 
Caginalp, G., Porter D. and Smith V. (2001) Financial Bubbles: Excess Cash, Momentum and 
Incomplete Information, The Journal of Psychology and Financial Markets, 2, 80–99. 
Caginalp, G. and Ilieva, V. (2008) The Dynamics of Trader Motivations in Security Bubbles, 
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organisation, 66, 641-656. 
Cella C., Ellul A., and Giannetti M. (2013) Investors’ Horizons and the Amplification of 
Market Shocks, The Review of Financial Studies, 26, 1607-1648. 
Deck, C.; Porter, D. and Smith, V. L. (2012) Double Bubbles in Security Markets with Multi-
ple Generations, Working paper. 
DeLong, J. B., Shleifer, A., Summers, L. H., and Waldmann, R. J. (1990a) Noise Trader Risk 
in Financial Markets, Journal of Political Economy, 98, 703-738 
DeLong, J. B., Shleifer, A., Summers, L. H., and Waldmann, R. J. (1990b). Positive 
Feedback Investment Strategies and Destabilizing Rational Speculation, The Journal of 
Finance, 45, 379-395. 
35 
Dow, J. and Gorton, G. (1994) Arbitrage Chains. The Journal of Finance, 49, 819-849. 
Fischbacher, U. (2007) z-Tree: Zurich Toolbox for Ready-made Economic Experiments, Ex-
perimental Economics, 10, 171-178. 
Froot K.A., Scharfstein D.S., and Stein J.C. (1992) Herd on the Street: Informational Ineffi-
ciencies in a Market with Short-Term Speculation, The Journal of Finance, 47, 1461-
1484. 
Greiner, B. (2004) Forschung und wissenschaftliches Rechnen 2003, An Online Recruitment 
System for Economic Experiments. GWDG Bericht 63. Gesellschaft fuer Wissenschaft-
liche Datenverarbeitung, Goettingen, 79-93. 
Greenwood, R. and Shleifer, A. (2014) Expectations of Returns and Expected Returns, The 
Review of Financial Studies, 27, 714-746. 
Haruvy, E. and Noussair C. (2006) The Effect of Short Selling on Bubbles and Crashes in 
Experimental Spot Security Markets, The Journal of Finance, 61, 1119–1157. 
Hirota, S. and Sunder, S. (2007) Price Bubbles sans Dividend Anchors: Evidence from La-
boratory Stock Markets, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 31, 1875-1909. 
Hommes, C., Sonnemans, J., Tuinstra, J., and van de Velden, H. (2005) Coordination of Ex-
pectations in Asset Pricing Experiments, The Review of Financial Studies, 18, 955-980. 
King, R., Smith, V., Williams, A., and van Boening, (1993) The Robustness of Bubbles and 
Crashes in Experimental Stock Markets, Nonlinear Dynamics and Evolutionary Eco-
nomics, Oxford University Press, M., Day, R. and Chen, P. (Eds.), 183-200. 
Kirchler, M.; Huber, J. and Stöckl, T. (2012) Thar She Bursts: Reducing Confusion Reduces 
Bubbles, The American Economic Review, 102, 865-883. 
Lei, V., C., Noussair, N., and Plott, C. R. (2001) Nonspeculative Bubbles in Experimental 
Security Markets: Lack of Common Knowledge of Rationality vs. Actual Irrationality, 
Econometrica, 69, 831-859. 
LeRoy, S. F., and Porter, R. D. (1981) The Present-Value Relation: Tests Based on Implied 
Variance Bounds,  Econometrica, 49, 555-574. 
Lim, S.S., Prescott, E.C., and Sunder, S. (1994) Stationary Solution to the Overlapping Gen-
erations Model of Fiat Money: Experimental Evidence, Empirical Economics, 19, 255-
277.  
Marimon, R. and Sunder S. (1993) Indeterminacy of Equilibria in a Hyperinflationary World: 
Experimental Evidence, Econometrica, 61, 1073-1107. 
36 
Miller, M., Modigliani, F., 1961. Dividend Policy, Growth and the Valuation of Shares, The 
Journal of Business, 34, 411-433. 
Morris, S. and Shin, H. S. (2004) Liquidity Black Holes, Review of Finance, 8, 1-18. 
Noussair, C., Richter, G. and Tyran, J.-R. (2012) Money Illusion and Nominal Inertia in Ex-
perimental Security Markets, Journal of Behavioral Finance, 13, 27-37. 
Palan, S. (2013) A Review of Bubbles and Crashes in Experimental Security Markets, Jour-
nal of Economic Surveys, 27, 570–588. 
Plott, C. and Sunder, S. (1982) Efficiency of Experimental Security Markets with Insider In-
formation: An Application of Rational-Expectations Models, Journal of Political Econ-
omy, 90, 663-698. 
Porter, D. P. and Smith, V. L. (1995) Futures Contracting and Dividend Uncertainty in Exper-
imental Security Markets, The Journal of Business, 68, 509-541. 
Scheinkman, J. A. and Xiong, W. (2003) Overconfidence and Speculative Bubbles, Journal 
of Political Economy, 111, 1183-220. 
Shiller, R. J. (1981) Do Stock Prices Move Too Much to be Justified by Subsequent Changes 
in Dividends? The American Economic Review, 71, 421-436. 
Smith, V. L., Suchanek, G. L., and Williams, A. W. (1988) Bubbles, Crashes, and Endogenous 
Expectations in Experimental Spot Security Markets, Econometrica, 56, 1119–1151. 
Smith, V., van Boening M. and Wellford C. (2000) Dividend Timing and Behavior in Labora-
tory Security Markets, Economic Theory, 16, 567–583. 
Stöckl, T.; Huber, J. and Kirchler, M. (2010) Bubble Measures in Experimental Security 
Markets, Experimental Economics, 13, 284-298. 
Tirole, J. (1985) Security Bubbles and Overlapping Generations, Econometrica, 53, 1071-
1100. 
Vissing-Jorgensen, A. (2003), Perspectives on Behavioral Finance: Does “Irrationality” Dis-




Table 1: Treatment overview 
 
  Liquidity 




# of entering 
generations  
1 T1H T1L 
2 T2H T2L 
4 T4H T4L 
8 T8H T8L 
 
 
Table 2: Treatment parameterization 
 
Treatment T1H T1L T2H T2L T4H T4L T8H T8L 
  
       
Market setup         
Number of generations 2 2 3 3 5 5 9 9 
Terminal dividend D 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
Initial no. securities/trader G0 32 32 16 16 8 8 4 4 
Initial no. of securities G(i) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total securities outstanding 160 160 80 80 40 40 20 20 
Total value of securities 8,000 8,000 4,000 4,000 2,000 2,000 1,000 1,000 
Initial cash/trader G0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Initial cash/trader G(i) 16,000 3,200 8,000 1,600 4,000 800 2,000 400 
Total cash 80,000 16,000 40,000 8,000 20,000 4,000 10,000 2,000 
Cash-security-ratio (C/A-
ratio) 10 2 10 2 10 2 10 2 
Invited subjects (3n+3) 15a 15a 18 18 18 18 18 18 
Participating subjects 90 90 108 108 108 108 108 108 










   Generation 0 (G0) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Transition generations   
 
500 100 500 100 500 100 
Last generation 1,000 200 1,000 200 1,000 200 1,000 200 
Predictors 133 133 133 133 133 133 133 133 
Expected payout/subject (€) 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 
Notes: The following parameters are identical across all treatments: Number of traders/generation (5); number of 
active generations (2); active traders (10 traders); period length (120 sec.); total number of periods (16); number 
of markets per treatment (6); number of expected transactions (160). 
a In treatments T1L and T1H we invited 15 subjects instead of 18 as no subject pool for future generations is 




Table 3: Average Period-RAD for each period  
 
Panel A: High-liquidity session 
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
T1 1.423 0.582 0.354 0.293 0.329 0.301 0.321 0.390 0.374 0.382 0.396 0.303 0.323 0.286 0.387 0.259 
T2 1.825 1.016 0.310 0.406 0.467 0.536 0.541 0.477 0.676 0.865 0.705 0.313 0.232 0.468 0.232 0.179 
T4 1.552 1.471 1.342 1.038 1.182 0.960 0.798 0.499 0.697 0.509 0.470 0.559 0.325 0.210 0.167 0.040 
T8 1.879 1.249 1.373 1.392 1.409 1.498 1.177 0.991 1.108 1.082 1.607 1.733 1.019 0.647 0.550 0.273 
 
Panel B: Low-liquidity session 
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
T1 0.226 0.139 0.106 0.098 0.077 0.101 0.103 0.138 0.152 0.158 0.147 0.070 0.084 0.083 0.085 0.085 
T2 0.596 0.425 0.299 0.278 0.503 0.685 0.743 0.760 0.342 0.352 0.222 0.146 0.071 0.053 0.085 0.115 
T4 0.385 0.489 0.495 0.543 0.517 0.527 0.556 0.653 0.535 0.530 0.511 0.459 0.341 0.163 0.110 0.052 
T8 0.527 0.214 0.249 0.398 0.315 0.313 0.355 0.499 0.446 0.584 0.628 0.741 0.663 0.679 0.230 0.066 
Notes: Cells shaded grey are periods where the last, dividend-collecting generation of traders is present. In the other periods (no shading) only short-term in-




Table 4: Comparison of average Period-RAD between periods with long-horizon inves-
tors and periods with only short-horizon investors 
 
(1) Periods with 
long-horizon in-
vestors 


























Table 5: Investment horizons and average Period-RAD 
































Notes: Sample size is in parentheses.  
 
Panel B: Differences between average Period-RAD across treatments 
High-liquidity Session (H) 
 T2 T4 T8 
T1  0.165*        0.318***     0.766*** 
T2   0.153     0.601*** 
T4       0.448*** 
Low-liquidity Session (L) 
 T2 T4 T8 
T1    0.239***        0.313***      0.313*** 
T2   0.075 0.074 
T4   0.000 




Table 6: Comparison of average Period-RD between periods with long-horizon investors 
and periods with only short-horizon investors 
 
(1) Periods with 
long-horizon 
investors 






























Periods with long-horizon investors Periods with short-horizon investors  
FUND TREND COMBINED FUND TREND COMBINED 
Const. 1.672** -0.709 1.733** 4.159** -2.611* 0.515 
 (0.622) (1.595) (0.620) (1.895) (1.310) (1.449) 
(Ft - Pt) 0.197***  0.211*** 0.109*  0.078 
 (0.043)  (0.053) (0.061)  (0.057) 
(Pt - Pt-1)  0.020 0.067  -0.301*** -0.270*** 
  (0.031) (0.044)  (0.049) (0.043) 
       
N 173 167 167 186 168 168 
F 20.96 0.42 8.09 3.19 37.71 25.16 
p 0.000 0.522 0.002 0.092 0.000 0.000 
adj. R2 0.38 0.00 0.39 0.14 0.30 0.36 




Periods with long-horizon investors Periods with short-horizon investors 
FUND TREND COMBINED FUND TREND COMBINED 
Const. -2.275*** 1.054 -2.543** -0.804 -0.248 -1.636** 
 (0.684) (0.737) (0.742) (0.524) (0.399) (0.671) 
(Ft - Pt) 0.401***  0.419*** 0.070***  0.065** 
 (0.092)  (0.096) (0.017)  (0.024) 
(Pt - Pt-1)  -0.088 -0.016  -0.162* -0.180** 
  (0.079) (0.031)  (0.081) (0.074) 
       
N 171 162 162 186 168 168 
F 19.36 1.26 10.10 16.25 3.95  5.82 
p 0.000 0.274 0.001 0.001 0.063 0.012 
adj. R2 0.43 0.01 0.43 0.08 0.08 0.13 
Notes: Standard errors clustered by session in parenthesis.  Significance levels: * (10%), ** (5%) 


















5 G0                 
5 G1                D 
T2 
5 G0                 
5 G1                 
5         G2        D 
T4 
5 G0                 
5 G1                 
5     G2             
5         G3         
5             G4    D 
T8 
5 G0                 
5 G1                 
5   G2               
5     G3             
5       G4           
5         G5         
5           G6       
5             G7     
5               G8  D 
Notes: D means that the last generation of investors receives terminal dividends (50) at the end of Period 16. 
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Figure 2: Period-wise average transaction prices in high-liquidity treatments. 
 
 
Notes: Volume-weighted mean prices from six individual sessions (grey lines) and Fundamental Value (FV, red 




Figure 3: Period-wise average transaction prices in low-liquidity treatments. 
 
Notes: Volume-weighted mean prices from six individual sessions (grey lines) and Fundamental Value (FV, red 




Figure 4: Average Period-RAD for each period number: Comparison between the 
markets with long-horizon investors and those with only short-horizon investors. 
Panel A: high-liquidity treatments; Panel B: low-liquidity treatments. 
 
Notes: In periods 15 and 16 long-horizon investors are present in all treatments (see, Table 3). Therefore only 





Figure 5: Average Period-RAD conditional on the number of entering generations left. 
Panel A: high-liquidity treatments; Panel B: low-liquidity treatments. 
 
Notes: Grey shaded bars represent values based on periods where only short-horizon investors were present. The 
black bold line represents periods where long-horizon investors were present. ***, **, or * indicates that the 
average Period-RAD across periods where only short-horizon investors were present is significantly different at 





Figure 6: Average Period-RD conditional on the number of entering generations left. 
Panel A: high-liquidity treatments; Panel B: low-liquidity treatments. 
 
Notes: Grey shaded bars represent values based on periods where only short-horizon investors were present. The 
black bold line represents periods where long-horizon investors were present. ***, **, or * indicates that the 
average Period-RD across periods where only short-horizon investors were present is significantly different at 






Appendix A: Instructions of the experiment24 
We welcome you to this experimental session and kindly ask you to refrain from talking to 
each other for the duration of the experiment. Please follow the instructions given by the ex-
perimenter. If you have any questions regarding the procedure or the instructions of the ex-
periment, contact one of the supervisors by raising your hand and your question will be an-
swered privately. Violation of instructions risks forfeiting all your earnings. 
 
General Instructions 
This is an experiment in market decision making. The instructions are simple, and if you fol-
low them carefully and make good decisions, you will earn more money. 
 
In this session, we conduct a market experiment in which you can trade an security we shall 
call “shares”. You are a member of a cohort of 18 subjects. The composition of this cohort 
remains constant throughout the experiment. You will participate in the market as an active 
trader (“trader”) only in some, not all, periods. If you do not actively participate in the market 
you will be asked to make certain predictions about the market.  
 
The process of assignment to the trading role in the market will be described shortly. This 
session consists of a total of 16 periods and trading in each period lasts for 120 seconds. 
 
Your total earnings from participating in the market as a trader and from the prediction task, 
denoted in Talers throughout the experiment, will be converted into Euros and paid to you in 
cash at the end of the session. The more Talers you earn, the more Euros you will take home. 
 
Course of the experimental session 
Market experiment 
Instructions to the experiment and explanation of the trading mechanism  
2 trial periods (not relevant for payment) and questionnaire 
Market experiment 
Private payment  
24 Instructions are for T2L. Instructions for other treatments and German translations used in Innsbruck are 
available from the authors upon request. Trading screens are identical across treatments (except parameter val-
ues). 
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Active market participants 
 
Assignment process 
Figure 1 illustrates the assignment process in the session. At the beginning of Period 1, five 
subjects will be randomly assigned to Cohort 1 while another five will be randomly assigned 
to Cohort 2. Members of these two cohorts will participate in trading in Periods 1 to 8. The 
remaining eight subjects will constitute the “pool” and its members will participate in the 
prediction task (see below), not in trading, in these periods.  
At the end of Period 8, five of the eight members of the pool are randomly chosen to form 
Cohort 3 who enters the market beginning Period 9; members of Cohort 2 stay in the market; 
and members of Cohort 1 leave the market to join the pool.  
The pool always has eight members who predict, and the market always has a total of 10 
members (5 from each of the two cohorts) who trade. After period 8, the “old” cohort 1 
leaves the market, and the new Cohort 3 enters. Note that your entry and exit from the market 




Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Cohort 1                 
Cohort 2                 
Cohort 3                 
 
Share value 
At the end of the session (period 16), any shares in the hands of the members of Cohort 3 will 
pay a dividend of 50 Taler per unit, while the shares held by cohort 2 will not pay a dividend. 
The shares do not pay any other dividends in earlier periods and are worthless after paying 
the dividend at the end of Period 16 to members of Cohort 3. 
 
Endowments and payment 
Cohort 1 will enter the market at the beginning of Period 1 with an endowment of 16 shares 
in the hands of each member and no cash. When they exit the market at the end of Period 8, 
any remaining shares in their hands are worthless. When cohort 1 exits, any unsold shares 
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(worthless to them) will be distributed among randomly chosen members of the entering co-
hort at no cost.  
Cohort 2 will enter the market at the beginning of period 1 with an endowment of 
1.600 Taler each and no shares. They may use these Talers to buy any number of shares they 
wish to. Again, when they exit the market at the end of Period 16, any remaining shares in 
their hands are worthless.  
Cohort 3 also enters the market with 1.600 Talers each and will be able to use these 
Talers to buy any shares they wish to during periods 9-16. At the end of Period 16, any shares 
remaining in their hands pay a dividend of 50 Taler each, which is added to their Taler hold-
ings.  
When Cohort 1 and 2 leave the market their Taler holdings will be converted into 
EURO at the following exchange rates: Cohort 1 and 2: 100 Taler = 1 Euro; Cohort 3: 200 
Taler = 1 Euro. 
 
Trading 
Trading will take place through a double auction (see Figure 2, explained in detail later on by 
the instructor). As a buyer you can submit as many bids as you wish, each for a single share, 
provided that you have enough cash to pay if your bids are accepted. Buying a share reduces 
your cash balance by the purchase price. Similarly, as a seller you can submit offer prices at 
which you are willing to sell each of the shares you own. You can accept any offer submitted 
by others if you have the cash to pay; and you can accept any bid from others if you own a 
share. If a bid or ask is accepted, a transaction is recorded at the bid/ask price. Prices are de-
termined only by the bids, asks and acceptances submitted by the traders in the market. Note 
that neither your share nor the Taler inventories are allowed to fall below zero. Outstanding 
bids and offers can be canceled at any time without cost. All bids and asks are automatically 








Trader: Information about your 
task (trader), period you leave 
the market, current Share and 
Taler holdings. 
Predictors: Information about 
your task (predictior) and your 
forecast. 
List of all BIDS: from all traders - your own 
bids are written in blue. The bid with blue back-
ground is always the most attractive, yielding 
the highest revenues for the seller. 
List of all ASKS: from all traders - your own 
asks are written in blue. The ask with blue 
background is always the most attractive, 
because it is the cheapest for the buyer. 
SELL: You sell one unit, 
given the price with the blue 
background.  
BUY: You buy one unit, 
given the price with the blue 
background. 
Current Market 
Price (of Stock) 
Price-Chart of current period 
Summary tables of your own BIDS and 
ASKS. With the “CANCEL”-buttons you can 
delete your own limit orders.  
BID: enter the price you are willing to pay for 
one unit. Trade does not take place until anoth-
er participant accepts your bid!!!  




At the beginning of each period participants who do not actively participate in the market are 
asked to predict the average of the prices at which shares will be traded during that period. 
Those participants will be able to monitor the market. At the end of each period, their predic-
tion will be compared to the actual average trading price. The more accurate the prediction, 
the more Talers they earn.  
Each period, you will earn 140 Taler minus the absolute value of your prediction error. 
For example, suppose, you predict a price of PP and the actual average trading price is AP, 
you have a prediction error of  PP-AP, and your prediction earnings will be 140 minus  
PP-AP.  
Taler will be converted into EURO at an exchange rate of 133 Taler = 1 Euro. You 
have 30 seconds to enter your prediction. If you do not enter a prediction value in time or 
your earnings would be negative, you will earn 0 Euro. 
 
At the end of each period you see a History Screen (Figure 3) for 15 seconds providing you 
with cumulative information. 
 
Important information 
• No interest is paid for Taler holdings. 
• Each trading period lasts for 120 seconds. 
• You have 30 sec. to enter your prediction. 
• The session ends after 16 periods. 
• Offers to buy/sell shares can be placed in the range from 0 to 999 Taler (with at most 
one decimal places). 
• Members of Cohort 3 (and only this cohort) receive a dividend of 50 Talers per share 
for their holdings at the end of Period 16. Shares are worthless thereafter. 





Before the actual session starts, there will be two trial periods to familiarize you with the 
trading mechanism. Each participant will be an active trader split into two cohorts. Members 
of Cohort 1 receive 4 shares and no Taler, while members of Cohort 2 receive 400 Taler and 
no shares. The security pays a dividend of 50 to members of Cohort 2. In contrast to the main 
experiment, you will also make predictions about the average trading price. Trial periods 
have no influence on your Euro earnings! 
 
Figure 3: History screen 
 
 
Your payment from the experiment 
Your payment from the experiment equals the sum of earning from participation in the mar-
ket plus the sum of earning from the prediction task. This amount will be paid to you in cash. 
 
Your payment = Sum of earnings from market experiment +  




average prices of previous 
periods. 
Closing Price of the 
security and pay-
ment from market 





and Taler holdings Average trading price, predic-tions and payment from the 
prediction task. 
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Appendix B: Questionnaire for understanding (correct answers in italic font). 
 
1.  How many trading periods are there during the session? 16 
2.  For how many seconds does one trading period last? 120 sec 
3.  If you buy a share for 350 Taler, what happens to your cash balance? (i) My cash balance 
decreases by 350. (ii) My cash balance increases by 350. (iii) Nothing happens to my cash 
balance. 
4.  If you sell a share for 350, what happens on your cash balance? (i) My cash balance de-
creases by 350. (ii) My cash balance increases by 350. (iii) Nothing happens to my cash 
balance. 
5.  Can you buy a share when you do not have enough cash to pay for the purchase? Yes/No. 
6.  Can you sell a share when you do not have a share? Yes/No. 
7.  What are the two ways of buying a share? (i) Submit a bid or accept an open offer to sell 
(ask). (ii) Submit an offer (ask) or accept an open offer to buy (bid). (iii) Submit a bid or 
accept an open offer to buy (bid). (iv) Submit an offer (ask) or accept an open offer to sell 
(ask).  
8.  What are the two ways of selling a share? (i) Submit a bid or accept an open offer to sell 
(ask). (ii) Submit an offer (ask) or accept an open offer to buy (bid). (iii) Submit a bid or 
accept an open offer to buy (bid). (iv) Submit an offer (ask) or accept an open offer to sell 
(ask).  
9.  You are a member of cohort 2. How are your Taler converted into real euros? (i) Ex-
change rate of 50 (100) Taler to 1 Euro. (ii) Exchange rate of 100 (500) Taler to 1 Euro. 
(iii) Exchange rate of 200 (1000) Taler to 1 Euro. Values in parenthesis for high cash 
treatments. Correct answers vary by treatment. 
10.  Are you allowed to talk, use email, or surf the web during the session? No. 
11.  Your role is “predictor”: You predict a price which is 8 Taler less than the actual average 
price of the period. What is your profit (in Taler)? 140-8=132 
12.  You are a member of cohort 1 and you will leave the market at the end of that period. 
What is the value of the shares you are holding at the end of the period? (i) Shares have a 
value 50. (ii) Shares have a value of 0. (iii) Shares have a value of 200.  
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